What Lies Ahead for U.S.-Mekong Relations in a Second Trump Administration?

A prediction for US-Mekong dynamics

Hello, Mekong Dispatch subscribers and new readers. We are pleased to introduce Truc Mai Nguyen, our newest contributor to the newsletter. She is a dedicated member of the Youth Policy Working Group under UNDP Vietnam. She is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in International Relations at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, focusing on Southeast Asia Studies and sustainability issues. Here are her views. Thank you for reading. The editors.

Trump’s approach to Southeast Asia is likely to be marked by apathy and indifference. While diplomatic and military engagement with the region may continue (as long as the region serves the U.S. a strategic position against China), economic cooperation is unlikely to be a priority. Regarding multilateralism, U.S. participation in ASEAN-led regional frameworks is expected to decline even further. A second Trump administration is unlikely to favor multilateralism in general, and Southeast Asia will be no exception.

Does this signal the end of U.S.-Mekong relations, especially in light of Trump's recent USAID cuts that have disrupted development initiatives in the region? While a second Trump administration may reduce engagement with Southeast Asia, this does not necessarily mean a weakening of ties with the Mekong subregion.

First, it was during Trump’s first term that the U.S. government established many of its current Mekong initiatives. Historically, the Lower Mekong had not always been a key focus of U.S. foreign policy. Its strategic importance emerged more recently as part of a broader counter-China strategy. The region first gained momentum under Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy, leading to the establishment of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) in 2009, in partnership with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. LMI focused on six pillars: Agriculture and Food Security, Connectivity, Education, Energy Security, Environment and Water, and Health, Gender, and other cross-cutting issues. Activities under this initiative included technical assistance, capacity-building, and empowering marginalized communities.

Under Trump’s 2016–2020 term, interest in the region increased as U.S.-China competition escalated. U.S. diplomats became more vocal in criticizing China’s upstream Mekong policies, which threatened water security for downstream countries. Notably, Trump upgraded LMI to the Mekong-U.S. Partnership (MUSP), emphasizing economic connectivity and water security alongside other non-traditional security issues. This period saw water issues being highly politicized to challenge China’s influence, positioning the U.S. as a key partner for Mekong countries. The Biden administration maintained this engagement under the “Free and Open Mekong” concept, aligning with his broader Indo-Pacific strategy.

Second, the Mekong region holds strategic interests that will likely capture Trump’s attention—namely, U.S.-China competition. Given that China will remain a central concern in Trump’s foreign policy, the Mekong region is expected to retain its relevance, even if it is not among the administration’s top priorities. While the U.S. will likely maintain its interest in the Mekong region, its approach may shift significantly.

First, Trump may pivot from a bottom-up to a top-down strategy. U.S. engagement in the Lower Mekong has traditionally relied on civil society and NGOs, while government-level interactions are limited to ministerial meetings. However, given Trump’s USAID cuts, development organizations’ role within MUSP may be disrupted. Community-level initiatives led by civil society organizations would receive less priority. A top-down approach, emphasizing direct high-level dialogues, might be favored as it aligns more closely with China’s high-level engagement with the region, and potentially increases U.S. influence over Mekong countries.

Second, economic connectivity will not be a focus. Trump’s "America First" policy prioritizes correcting trade imbalances, meaning economic engagement with the Mekong region could be hampered by tariffs and other trade restrictions. As a result, the Connectivity pillar of MUSP is unlikely to receive significant attention.

Third, lacking emphasis on grassroots engagement and economic ties, Trump may opt for a more confrontational stance against China, particularly through diplomacy. His administration is expected to continue politicizing and securitizing Mekong issues, especially water security. Rhetorically, the U.S. could adopt a harsher tone toward China, as reflected in key Trump cabinet appointments. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz - both known for their tough stance on China - are expected to shape a hardline foreign policy. At the same time, the U.S. will work to internationalize Mekong affairs, countering China’s efforts to keep the issues regional.

Although the outlook for Trump-Southeast Asia relations seems bleak, I remain optimistic about continued U.S.-Mekong engagement. While mutual social initiatives and economic trade may not see positive developments, I anticipate more dialogues and a tougher U.S. stance against China on regional security issues.

Author: Truc Mai Nguyen